Flow-based p-hub median interdiction problem

Abstract

There are two players in a network interdiction problem: a network user who wishes to operate a system optimally, and an opponent/interdictor who tries to prevent the system from operating optimally. Interdiction problems can be modeled as a bi-level min-max or max-min problem in the Stackelberg Game logic. In this thesis, we handle the interdiction problem within the context of the p-hub median problem. The network user solves the problem of locating p hubs to minimize the cost associated with operating the network. In response to the network user, the interdictor tries to maximize network user’s cost by removing hub characteristics of effective hubs with its limited resources. The p-hub median problem of the network user is modeled on the flow-based networks. The model we develop in this study, unlike the previous literature, does not require the complete network and enables one to find the correct solution in cases that do not provide triangle inequality between nodes. Therefore, this new model provides significant advantages regarding the solution times and modeling capabilities compared to the facility interdiction models offered by the literature.